A poisoned script on 178 websites, Ledger.com included, swapped crypto addresses for a day
On 16 November 2026, malicious code injected through the Optimizely testing platform ran on the websites of 178 organisations, including Ledger, the BBC, Zoom and HSBC. It replaced crypto addresses, skimmed card numbers and targeted iPhones. How it worked, who was hit and what to check.
Key facts
- When: Sunday 16 November 2026. The first injection was seen at 04:21 UTC; almost every site was cleaned between about 20:40 and 21:50 UTC.
- How: malicious JavaScript was added to customer projects on Optimizely Web, an A/B testing service whose script many large websites load on every page.
- Scale: 188 infected scripts belonging to 178 organisations, including Ledger (ledger.com), the BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC and Equifax, according to the security firm Report URI.
- What it did: replaced crypto addresses with the attacker's on the page and in the clipboard, skimmed card numbers typed into forms, sent screenshots and cookies to the attacker, and pushed exploit kits to older iPhones.
- Money taken: about $7,040 in crypto had reached the attacker's wallets by 19:25 UTC.
What happened
Optimizely Web lets companies test variants of their pages: a site includes one Optimizely script, and the marketing team can change what the page does without touching the site's own code. On 16 November, an attacker added malicious code to the "Project JavaScript" of many Optimizely customers. The poisoned code was then served from Optimizely's own servers, as a normal part of each site.
Report URI, a company that sells tools to monitor the scripts running on websites, documented the campaign. Its sweep that evening found 186 infected scripts among 1,611 Optimizely snippets checked, and 188 in total, belonging to 178 organisations: banks, media, software companies, retailers and Ledger, the hardware wallet maker, whose snippet on ledger.com and www.ledger.com was cleaned at about 20:41 UTC.
Optimizely told Gizmodo that an unauthorised party had "exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow", that affected customers had been notified, and that it had blocked the vulnerable path and deployed a fix.
What the code did
Once loaded, the script did several things at once:
- Address swapping. It looked for Bitcoin, Ethereum and other EVM, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin addresses in page text, form fields, links, images and the clipboard, and replaced them with addresses controlled by the attacker. Copy an address from an affected page, paste it in your wallet, and you would be sending to someone else.
- Card skimming. From 13:43 UTC, it also captured card numbers, expiry dates and security codes typed into the sites' own forms. Payment forms hosted by a payment provider in a separate frame were not affected.
- Spying. It sent the page address, readable cookies, the swapped addresses and a screenshot of the page to the attacker's server.
- iPhone exploits. On older iPhones and iPads, it loaded the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits, aimed at iOS 13 to 18.
Report URI counted about $7,040 received by the attacker's wallets in roughly nine hours, the largest single amount being 0.083 BTC. The real total of card fraud is not known.
What it means for Ledger users
The code ran in visitors' browsers on Ledger's website. Nothing in the public reports suggests that Ledger devices or the Ledger Live app were involved, and Ledger had not commented in the reports we found. The danger was for anyone who copied an address from a page, or typed a card number into a form, on one of the affected sites on 16 November.
What to check
- If you sent crypto on 16 November to an address copied from one of these websites, compare it with the address you meant to use, and check the transaction on a block explorer.
- Always verify the address on your hardware wallet's screen before you confirm, character by character, not only the first and last few. The device screen is the one place a script in your browser cannot rewrite.
- Update your iPhone or iPad to iOS 18.7.3 or iOS 26.3 or later.
- If you paid by card on an affected site that day, watch your statements and report any unknown transaction to your bank.
- Site owners using Optimizely Web should check their project code for the domain
1688360.cc,atob(calls and any script they did not write, review who has write access, and rotate credentials, as Report URI recommends.
What to take away
- A website is only as trustworthy as every script it loads. None of these companies was hacked directly. One third-party tool, trusted by all of them, was enough to put the same malicious code on 178 sites.
- The clipboard is an attack surface. Address-swapping malware does not need to break anything: it waits for you to copy and paste. Checking the address on a screen the attacker does not control is the real defence.
- Strict security headers help. A Content Security Policy that limits where a page can send data would have blocked the script's reports to its server on many sites.
- Your seed is the one thing a script should never see. The safest recovery phrase is one that is never typed or pasted into a browser at all.
This article is based on Report URI's analysis and public reports available on 17 November 2026. Report URI sells script-monitoring products, and Optimizely had not published a detailed explanation at the time of writing.
Sources
- World's largest brands infected with malware via Optimizely, Report URI
- Sprawling malware attack reportedly affects Zoom and other major brands, Gizmodo
- Researchers find crypto malware in Optimizely scripts, The Defiant
- OPTIMJACK: Optimizely malware hits 178 brands with crypto clipper, card skimmer and iOS exploits, SecurityOnline