KelpDAO's $292 million rsETH bridge exploit: one verifier, two poisoned servers, and a DeFi-wide rescue

On 18 April 2026, attackers tricked the bridge behind KelpDAO's rsETH into releasing 116,500 tokens backed by nothing, then borrowed against them on Aave. No smart-contract bug was involved. How it happened, how DeFi plugged the hole, and the lawsuit that followed.

By SeedCrypt Editorial5 min read

Key facts

  • When: 18 April 2026, at 17:35 UTC.
  • How much: 116,500 rsETH, about $292 million and roughly 18% of rsETH's supply, the largest DeFi exploit of 2026 at the time.
  • How: rsETH's bridge relied on a single verifier. Attackers compromised two of the servers it read from and knocked a third offline, so it confirmed a token transfer that never happened.
  • Knock-on effect: the attacker deposited 89,567 of the stolen rsETH on Aave and borrowed about $190 million in ETH against them.
  • Who: LayerZero attributed the attack to TraderTraitor, part of North Korea's Lazarus Group.
  • Since: a coalition led by Aave restored rsETH's backing by 25 May. KelpDAO's developer sued LayerZero in September.

What rsETH is

rsETH is a liquid restaking token issued by KelpDAO. Users deposit ETH, KelpDAO restakes it through EigenLayer to earn extra rewards, and users receive rsETH, which they can trade or use as collateral elsewhere.

rsETH also circulates on more than 20 other blockchains. To move it between chains, KelpDAO used LayerZero, a cross-chain messaging system: tokens are burned or locked on one chain, a verifier confirms it, and a contract on the other chain releases the same amount. On Ethereum, that contract holds the reserves backing every rsETH on the other networks. That made it the obvious target.

What happened

LayerZero's account of the attack, cited by Chainalysis and OpenZeppelin, goes like this:

  • KelpDAO's bridge relied on a single verifier (a "1-of-1 DVN" in LayerZero's terms), run by LayerZero Labs. To check what happened on other chains, that verifier queried a handful of RPC nodes, the servers that read blockchain data.
  • The attackers obtained the list of those nodes, broke into two of them, hosted by LayerZero, and replaced their software. The poisoned nodes kept giving truthful answers to everyone else, including LayerZero's monitoring, and were designed to erase their traces afterwards.
  • At the same time, a denial-of-service attack knocked out an external node, leaving the verifier with only the two compromised ones.
  • The poisoned nodes reported that 116,500 rsETH had been burned on Unichain. That never happened. The verifier confirmed the message, and at 17:35 UTC the Ethereum contract released 116,500 rsETH to the attacker.

KelpDAO's emergency multisig paused its core contracts at 18:21 UTC, 46 minutes later. Two follow-up attempts at 18:26 and 18:28 UTC failed, including a second forged message aimed at another 40,000 rsETH, worth about $95 million.

No smart contract was broken. As OpenZeppelin put it, the contracts did exactly what they were written to do. The failure was in the configuration and the servers around them.

From bridge to lending market

The stolen rsETH did not sit still. The attacker deposited 89,567 rsETH on Aave, the largest lending protocol, and borrowed about $190 million in ETH across Ethereum and Arbitrum.

Aave's own contracts were not exploited, but it was left holding collateral that was suddenly worth much less than its face value. Aave froze rsETH markets within hours. Its ETH pools on several networks hit 100% utilisation, meaning lenders who had never touched rsETH could not withdraw their ETH. Early estimates of Aave's bad debt ranged from about $124 million to $230 million, depending on how losses would be shared among rsETH holders.

On 20 April, Arbitrum's Security Council froze 30,766 ETH, about $71 million, at an address tied to the attacker, acting on input from law enforcement. The funds were moved to a wallet that can only be unlocked through Arbitrum governance.

The rescue

Aave then led a coalition of DeFi protocols, called DeFi United, which gathered more than $300 million in ETH commitments. The plan, published on 28 April:

  • convert the committed ETH into rsETH in tranches, so that every rsETH in circulation would again be fully backed;
  • clear the attacker's positions on Aave and Compound, about $246 million, through controlled liquidations approved by governance votes;
  • make affected users whole, without spreading the loss across Aave's users.

The first tranche of 25,000 rsETH was bridged on 13 May, and rsETH withdrawals reopened the next day. The last tranche, 20,373.7 rsETH, arrived on 25 May, and KelpDAO said rsETH was fully backed again, five weeks after the attack. Arbitrum's governance voted to put the frozen ETH towards the recovery.

KelpDAO also announced on 6 May that it would move rsETH from LayerZero to Chainlink's CCIP. LayerZero said it would no longer sign messages for applications that rely on a single verifier.

Who is to blame

LayerZero blamed KelpDAO for running a single-verifier setup, which it said contradicted its recommendation to use several. KelpDAO answered that this setup was LayerZero's documented default.

On 24 September 2026, Evercrest Technologies, the company behind KelpDAO, filed a civil claim in the Supreme Court of British Columbia against LayerZero Labs, its Canadian entity and co-founder Bryan Pellegrino, for negligent misrepresentation, negligence and defamation. It alleges that LayerZero reviewed and endorsed the configuration, and that the attackers first got in through social engineering and malware on a LayerZero developer's computer. Pellegrino called the claim meritless. None of these allegations has been tested in court.

What to take away

  • An audit covers code, not the whole system. The contracts worked as written. The weak points were a configuration choice and a few servers that no audit looked at.
  • One verifier is one point of failure. A second, independent verifier would have refused the forged message.
  • A wrapped or restaked token is a claim on a reserve. When the bridge holding that reserve is emptied, every copy on every chain is affected at once.
  • In DeFi, losses travel. Within hours, stolen tokens became collateral on Aave, and people who had never held rsETH could not withdraw their own ETH.
  • North Korean groups keep coming back. Drift on 1 April, KelpDAO on 18 April, Binance in October: the same actors are suspected each time.

This article is based on public reports available on 14 November 2026. The lawsuit against LayerZero was pending.

Sources

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