Drift Protocol hack: six months of social engineering, two pre-signed transactions, $285 million gone
On 1 April 2026, attackers took admin control of Drift, Solana's largest perpetual futures exchange, using multisig approvals they had collected weeks earlier. No code was broken. How the heist worked, the Circle controversy, and where Drift's users stand now.
Key facts
- When: 1 April 2026, starting at about 16:05 UTC.
- How much: about $285 million in first estimates. Drift's own accounting later put user losses at about $295 million, more than half of the protocol's deposits.
- How: no smart-contract bug. Attackers spent months befriending Drift contributors, got Security Council members to pre-sign transactions they did not understand, then used them to take admin control and list a worthless token as collateral.
- Who: TRM Labs and Elliptic attributed the attack to North Korean state-linked hackers. Drift said the forensic firm Mandiant reached the same conclusion.
- Since: a recovery plan backed by up to $127.5 million from Tether, and a relaunch under a new name, Velocity DEX.
What Drift was
Drift Protocol was the largest decentralised perpetual futures exchange on Solana. Users deposited assets into its vaults to trade with leverage, lend or earn yield, and at least 20 other protocols built products on top of its liquidity. Like most DeFi platforms, it was controlled by a multisig: a group of key holders, here called the Security Council, whose combined signatures could change the protocol's settings.
Six months of preparation
The heist was not improvised. Drift's own investigation, summarised by Nexus Mutual, TRM Labs and Chainalysis, describes a patient campaign:
- Autumn 2025: people posing as a quantitative trading firm met Drift contributors at a crypto conference and set up a Telegram group with them.
- December 2025 to January 2026: the "firm" opened a vault on Drift with more than $1 million of its own money, building credibility.
- February to March 2026: malware reached at least two contributors' devices, through a booby-trapped code repository exploiting a code-editor vulnerability and a fake app distributed through Apple's TestFlight.
- 11 and 12 March: 10 ETH withdrawn from Tornado Cash funded the creation of a token called CarbonVote (CVT). The attackers seeded it with a tiny amount of liquidity on the Raydium exchange and traded it with themselves to fake a price history close to $1.
- 23 to 30 March: at least two Security Council members signed transactions they did not fully understand. The transactions looked routine but carried hidden admin authorisations.
- 27 March: Drift moved its Security Council to a 2-of-5 multisig with no timelock, removing the delay that could have let anyone spot and block a malicious change.
The trick: transactions that never expire
A normal Solana transaction expires after about 90 seconds if it is not executed. Durable nonces, a legitimate Solana feature, let a signed transaction stay valid indefinitely. The attackers created durable nonce accounts so that the signatures they collected in March could be used whenever they chose.
On 1 April, at 16:05:18 UTC, the first pre-signed transaction proposed handing admin control to an attacker address. One second later, the second approved and executed it. Because the signatures were genuine, nothing in the system flagged them.
Twelve minutes
With admin control, the attackers listed CVT as collateral with loose risk limits, raised withdrawal limits and deposited about 500 million CVT, which Drift's price feed valued at roughly $500 million. They then borrowed and withdrew real assets against it: about $155 million in JLP tokens, tens of millions in USDC, $11.3 million in cbBTC and smaller amounts of more than a dozen other tokens.
According to TRM Labs and Nexus Mutual, most of the money left in about 12 minutes, through 31 withdrawals. The Telegram chats and the malware were wiped afterwards.
The Circle controversy
Most of the loot was swapped into USDC and moved from Solana to Ethereum through Circle's own bridge, the Cross-Chain Transfer Protocol. About $230 million in USDC crossed in more than 100 transactions over roughly six hours, during US business hours, before being converted into ETH.
Circle, which issues USDC and can freeze it, did not intervene. The on-chain investigator ZachXBT criticised it publicly, and on 15 April a Drift investor filed a class action against Circle in the US District Court in Massachusetts, alleging negligence and aiding and abetting the conversion of stolen funds. Those are allegations, not findings. Others defended Circle, arguing that freezing funds without a legal order would turn every future freeze into an arbitrary judgement call.
Who did it
TRM Labs and Elliptic attributed the attack to North Korean state-linked hackers. Nexus Mutual's report names the group tracked as UNC4736, also known as AppleJeus or Citrine Sleet. Drift said Mandiant identified a North Korea-backed group, and assessed with medium-high confidence that the same operation was behind the October 2024 Radiant Capital hack, worth about $50 million. Drift also said that the people its contributors met in person were not North Korean nationals, which suggests intermediaries were used.
Where things stand
On 16 April, Drift published a recovery plan, detailed further in May:
- Each affected user receives recovery tokens, separate from the DRIFT governance token, each representing $1 of verified loss and a claim on a recovery pool.
- The pool started with about $3.8 million in remaining assets. It is meant to grow with exchange revenue, recovered funds, up to $127.5 million from Tether tied to performance and $20 million from partners.
- Drift said it would switch its settlement asset from USDC to Tether's USDT. About $3.36 million in stolen USDC was frozen, and Drift offered a 10% bounty on recovered assets.
- New security rules: dedicated signing devices, transactions checked independently of the signing interface, timelocks on critical actions, and durable nonces disabled for all signers.
The full plan still needed token-holder votes, and even with Tether's support the pool falls well short of the losses at the start, so full repayment could take years.
In July 2026, Drift rebranded as Velocity DEX and opened a private beta. CryptoBriefing reported a public launch in September, and that co-founder Cindy Leow stepped down on 29 September.
What to take away
- A multisig only protects you if signers know what they sign. Here the threshold was met with real signatures. The failure was blind signing, not cryptography.
- Timelocks are a safety net. Removing the delay on admin changes, five days before the attack, removed the last chance to catch it.
- Social engineering now runs for months. Fake firms, real deposits, in-person meetings and poisoned code repositories: the target was the people, not the code.
- Money in a protocol is not in your custody. However well you guard your own seed phrase, assets you deposit in a DeFi platform depend on that platform's admin keys and the people holding them.
This article is based on public reports available on 14 November 2026. The attribution relies on forensic firms and Drift's own investigation; the lawsuit against Circle had not been decided.
Sources
- North Korean hackers attack Drift Protocol in $285 million heist, TRM Labs
- Drift Protocol hack: how privileged access led to a $285M loss, Chainalysis
- Drift Protocol: incident report, Nexus Mutual
- Incident recovery update, Drift
- Drift outlines a recovery plan for users after $295 million DPRK-linked exploit, CoinDesk
- Circle faces class action lawsuit after Drift Protocol hack, Cointelegraph
- Drift Protocol rebrands to Velocity DEX ahead of relaunch, The Defiant
- Velocity DEX CEO Cindy Leow steps down after relaunch, CryptoBriefing