Coldcard's broken randomness: how a 2021 firmware bug led to $100M+ in bitcoin thefts
A build error made Coldcard hardware wallets generate seeds from a weak software random number generator since March 2021. Attackers started draining wallets on 30 July 2026. What went wrong, who is affected and what to do.
Key facts
- The bug: since a firmware release in March 2021, affected Coldcard devices generated seed phrases from a predictable software routine instead of their hardware random number generator.
- Affected models: Mk2, Mk3, Mk4, Mk5 and Q. Tapsigner, Opendime and Satscard run different software and are not affected.
- The thefts: they began on 30 July 2026. Galaxy Research tallied about 1,816 BTC (roughly $116 million) taken from more than 5,200 addresses in the first days. A lawsuit puts losses above $140 million.
- The fix: patched firmware exists, but it does not repair seeds already created. Affected users must create a new wallet and move their funds.
What went wrong
A seed phrase is only as strong as the randomness used to create it. A 12-word seed is designed to carry 128 bits of entropy: a number of possible seeds so large that guessing one is out of reach for any computer.
According to Coinkite, the company behind Coldcard, a build configuration error introduced with a firmware release in March 2021 routed seed generation to a software routine that only imitates randomness, drawing mostly on predictable inputs such as the internal clock. A proposed class action names it as MicroPython's Yasmarang generator. A safeguard was meant to catch this, but it only checked that a setting existed, not that it was turned on, so the problem passed testing for years.
The result, as reported by Blockhead and TRM Labs:
- Mk2 and Mk3: about 40 bits of real randomness instead of 128.
- Mk4, Mk5 and Q: these also mix in randomness from a separate security chip. Coinkite put the total at about 72 bits, but Block's security team found that only about 32 bits of that extra randomness reached the final seed.
Forty bits is about a trillion possibilities: a large number for a person, a small one for an attacker with dedicated hardware. Because every possible seed can be derived and checked against public blockchain balances, attackers did not need access to anyone's device.
How the thefts unfolded
The first wave hit on 30 July 2026: about 594 BTC, worth roughly $38 million at the time, moved out of about 500 wallets into a single address in 25 minutes. Three more waves followed over the next four days.
By early August, Galaxy Research counted about 1,816 BTC (around $116 million) taken from more than 5,200 addresses. Blockchain analytics firm TRM Labs noted that laundering had barely started, with a first 64.9 BTC sent to the Wasabi mixer and 200 ETH to Tornado Cash on 4 August, and that differences between the waves suggest more than one attacker. TRM ranked it the largest hardware wallet exploit of 2026.
Coinkite's response
Coinkite disclosed the problem on 30 July, the day the thefts began. Its chief executive, known as NVK, published an open letter urging users who generated a seed on a Coldcard to move their funds immediately. Fixed firmware followed quickly, including version 4.2.0 for the Mk2 and Mk3.
Coinkite has said it believes an attacker may have found the flaw by running automated, possibly AI-assisted, review over its publicly available source code, while acknowledging it does not know for certain. It has promised a detailed post-mortem, which had not been published at the time of writing.
Who needs to act
Treat your wallet as affected if the seed was generated on a Coldcard since March 2021. Coinkite's guidance is that seeds created with at least 50 physical dice rolls, or protected by a separate passphrase, are not exposed in the same way. If you are not sure how your seed was created, assume it is affected.
- Update the device to the latest firmware.
- Generate a new seed on the updated device, ideally adding your own dice rolls.
- Check the new wallet's fingerprint and a receive address.
- Send a small test transaction, then move the rest of your funds.
Updating the firmware alone does nothing for an existing seed: the weakness is in the seed itself, not in the device.
The lawsuit
On 11 September 2026, a proposed class action was filed in Ontario against Coinkite and its co-founders Rodolfo Novak and Peter D. Gray. It alleges losses above $140 million and claims that bitcoin developer James O'Beirne warned Coinkite about the vulnerability in May 2025, and that affected customers were not notified directly. These are allegations: none has been proven in court, and the class has not been certified.
The wider lesson
Coldcard is one of the most respected names in bitcoin self-custody, with open-source firmware that anyone can read. This incident shows the limits of that guarantee: code being public does not mean someone has checked it, and attackers can now scan it at scale.
A few habits limit the damage of a single faulty device. Add your own entropy, such as dice rolls, when creating a seed. Use a passphrase. For large amounts, use a multisig setup that combines devices from different manufacturers, so one vendor's bug is not enough to empty a wallet.
Note what no backup method can fix: a seed generated with weak randomness stays weak however carefully it is stored afterwards. Encrypting or engraving a compromised seed protects it from being read, not from being guessed. The only remedy is a new seed.
This article is based on public reports available on 14 November 2026. Figures may change once Coinkite publishes its post-mortem.
Sources
- The largest hardware wallet exploit of 2026: inside the $116 million Coldcard hack, TRM Labs
- Coldcard hardware wallets shipped with broken randomness for five years, Coinkite confirms, Blockhead
- Coldcard exploit reignites bitcoin self-custody debate, CoinDesk
- Proposed class action filed against Coinkite and co-founders, Crowdfund Insider